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Abstract
An important element for the public support of policies is their perceived justice. At the same
time most policy choices have uncertain outcomes. We report the results of a first experiment
investigating just allocations of resources when some recipients are exposed to uncertainty.
Although, under certainty almost all uninvolved participants distribute resources equally, they
exhibit remarkable heterogeneity in just allocations under uncertainty. Moreover, uninvolved
participants allocate on average less to recipients exposed to higher degrees of uncertainty
and allocations are correlated with their own risk preferences. The observed allocations are
consistent with four different views of justice under uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
Uncertainty is an inevitable feature of most policy choices, as the ultimate outcome of a policy
is often prone to events beyond the area of influence of the social decision maker. Moreover, in
social decision making not only the possibility of random events have to be taken into account
but also how a choice may impact the (relative) well-being of those affected by the policy. For
example, a decision maker may have to decide between subsidizing and encouraging the use of a
well tested safe vaccine and a new vaccine that with some probability will save more lives but may
also induce strong adverse reactions (cf. Adler and Sanchirico 2006, p.282). A similar problem
is also prominently present in the debate on organ allocation criteria. The ‘maximum benefit
criterion’ proposes to rank potential organ donees according to their probability of survival after
the transplant, whereas opponents argue that information on patients’ mortality risk should not
affect the ranking (Childress 2001).
In fact, policy decisions face the problem of uncertainty in almost any area where scarce
resources should be allocated justly. For example, what is a just compensation scheme for civil
servants occupying risky jobs (e.g., firefighters, police) relative to other safer positions? Or, what
is the just allocation of resources between researchers proposing projects with relatively certain
outcomes and researchers proposing projects with high benefit when lucky but low benefit when
unlucky? In this paper we experimentally investigate the general question that underlies all these
problems. What constitutes a just allocation when some recipients of resources are exposed to
uncertainty?
The problem uncertainty introduces when considering just allocations can most clearly be
exemplified for equally deserving recipients. Under certainty it seems natural that any just
allocation would comprise an equal distribution of resources. However, when at least one of
the recipients is faced with uncertainty different ideas of justice that have been discussed in the
literature may lead to different just allocations.1 A utilitarian approach would allocate resources
1The problems studied in the extensive normative theoretical literature on how to assess social situations
involving risk are not equivalent to the problem of just allocation of resources under uncertainty we consider. Nev-
ertheless, the justice concepts of utilitarianism (e.g., Harsanyi 1955), ex ante egalitarianism (e.g., Diamond 1967,
Larry G. Epstein 1992), and ex post egalitarianism (e.g., Adler and Sanchirico 2006) discussed in this literature
provide important guidance in how to think about just allocations under uncertainty. See also Ben-Porath et al.
(1997) and Gajdos and Maurin (2004) who propose a convex combination of an ex ante criterion and an ex post
criterion and Fleurbaey (2010) who introduces the ‘expected equally distributed equivalent’ that also combines ex
ante and ex post criteria.
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such that the sum of expected utilities is maximized but would be indifferent to the possibility of
resulting inequalities. When the social decision maker has an aversion to inequality she may take
on an ex ante or ex post view. In the ex ante view, focusing on initial symmetry of recipients,
a just allocation would either equalize expected outcomes or expected utilities, depending on
whether or not risk preferences of recipients are taken into account in the evaluation. In the ex
post view, the distribution of actual outcomes determines how just the allocation is. Notably,
when ex post redistribution is not feasible, the ex post outcomes can only be influenced by ex
ante redistribution of resources. This brief discussion already illustrates that, when there is
uncertainty, different views of justice will in general lead to different distributions of resources
and utilities. Hence, conflicting ideas about justice under uncertainty could significantly impact
the support for policies and affect public policy design. Arguably this conflict reaches beyond
the public policy domain as it may impact (the perception of) decisions in firms, organizations
and other economic environments where people may care about just allocations.
In this paper we report results of, to the best of our knowledge, the first experiment exploring
just allocations when a recipient is exposed to various degrees of uncertainty. The experiment
consisted of a production phase followed by an allocation phase. Participants were randomly
divided into groups of three. In the production phase, in each group, two participants were
engaged in a real effort task to produce a joint monetary output. The effort task was calibrated
such that each participant in a pair produced the same share and, thus, was equally deserving
in that respect. In the allocation phase, the third group member was put into the position of
a social planner, henceforth called Benevolent Dictator (BD, Konow 2000), and was asked to
distribute the money between the other two participants. The BD did not have any stakes in the
monetary output and received a payment independent of her decision. Thus, the only incentive
of a BD was to implement just allocations.2,3
2One may argue that the BD has actually no incentive to act justly but may instead make random decisions.
This is certainly a possibility. However, as the elicitation of just choices requires by definition an uninvolved
decision maker, in our opinion, the chosen implementation is as close as one can get to incentivizing just choices.
Moreover, there are theoretical arguments and empirical facts that support the assumption that in the chosen set-up
participants will indeed decide according to their view of justice. Theoretically, Konow (2000) and Karni and Safra
(2002), for instance, argue that individuals suffer some disutility when actual allocations deviate from what they
deem to be just and thus face an (intrinsic) incentive to act justly. Empirically, it is also found that the described
procedure implements just choices (see, e.g., Konow 2000, Cappelen et al. 2013). Moreover, our results also indicate
that BD’s make just and not random choices (see Section 4.1).
3It is important to note that the implemented third-party impartiality procedure is not equivalent to the
Rawlsian veil of ignorance (Rawls 1971), because BDs’ earnings in the experiment are completely unrelated to
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Importantly, the BD had to make decisions in several allocation problems. In all problems,
one recipient did not face uncertainty and earned exactly what was allocated to him. In contrast,
the earnings of the other recipient were uncertain in all but one allocation problem. In problems
characterized by uncertainty earnings could be larger or smaller than what was allocated. Across
allocation problems we varied the level of uncertainty while keeping the expected value of a given
allocation constant. In the final part of the experiment we elicited participants’ risk preferences
and their beliefs about the risk preferences of other participants in their group.
This design allows us to focus on our main conjectures and questions. When there is no
uncertainty, we expect that participants in the role of BD choose the same just allocation, the
equal split. However, do just allocations of different BDs also coincide when one recipient is
exposed to uncertainty? Do just allocations change with the degree of uncertainty comprised by
the different allocation problems? Are just allocations under uncertainty guided by principles
of justice like utilitarianism, ex post or ex ante egalitarianism? Another question we can tackle
with our design is whether or not just allocations are related to risk preferences of BDs or their
beliefs about recipients risk preferences. In other words, do potential differences in observed just
allocations of BDs ‘merely’ reflect differences in (perceived) risk preferences or could they reflect
substantial disagreement regarding ideas of justice under uncertainty? Answers to these questions
are important as adherence to different, perhaps conflicting, justice views, can substantially
impact support for allocation and redistribution policies and public policy design.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find that in the absence of
uncertainty almost all BDs allocate resources exactly equally between recipients. We take this
as evidence that (i) our procedure indeed elicits just allocations and that (ii) equal treatments of
equals is the prevalent justice view under certainty. Second, just allocations under uncertainty
exhibit substantial heterogeneity in each allocation problem. This shows that even when people
implicitly agree on just allocations in certain environments they likely have conflicting justice
views when uncertainty prevails. Third, just allocations respond to the degree of uncertainty
and, on average, less is allocated to the recipient facing uncertainty the higher the degree of
their allocation decisions. We deliberately did not choose a ‘behind the veil of ignorance’ approach because it
has been shown that the type of uncertainty entailed by the veil of ignorance influences individuals’ allocation
behavior by introducing insurance purposes (Aguiar et al. 2010, Schildberg-Ho¨risch 2010) and strategic consid-
erations (Gerber et al. 2013). For experiments investigating the idea of the veil of ignorance empirically see the
seminal work of Frohlich et al. (1987) and Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1990) and, e.g., Gerber et al. (2013) for
recent evidence.
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uncertainty. Fourth, more risk averse BDs allocate more to the recipient facing uncertainty,
whereas their beliefs about recipients’ risk preferences seem not to guide choices. Finally, we
also explore whether justice views derived from utilitarianism and egalitarianism can organize
the observed just allocations. We find that a small majority of BDs make choices consistent
with some form of ex ante equality but that utilitarian and ex post egalitarian views also find
support. This plurality of justice views under uncertainty is consistent with a similar finding in
the context of accountability by Cappelen et al. (2007).
Our paper builds on the tradition of empirical investigations of justice views initiated by
the seminal paper of Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) (see also Kahneman et al. 1986). These early
studies were employing surveys and vignettes and have led to a stream of papers using these
methodologies that greatly improved our knowledge about peoples justice views (see, e.g.,
Schokkaert and Overlaet 1989, Schokkaert and Capeau 1991, Faravelli 2007 and Konow 2003,
Tausch et al. 2013, for overviews).
Konow (2000) was the first to use incentivized experiments in justice research. He intro-
duced a non-involved subject, the BD, that was asked to allocate money to two anonymous
recipients the joint product of their work. He finds that resources are less likely to be allocated
in proportion to individuals’ contributions when differences in productivity are random as com-
pared to when they result from subjects’ differential efforts. These results have been replicated
by Dickinson and Tiefenthaler (2002) who contrast earned rights to non-earned ones in a more
complex environment. Cappelen et al. (2007) also focus on individuals’ justice ideas in situations
involving production, but use allocation data from a standard dictator game. Their main finding
is that when there are asymmetries between recipients there exists a plurality of justice ideas.
In essence, these studies show that individuals are retained responsible for their outcomes when-
ever they can reasonably influence such outcomes. None of these studies allows for uncertain
outcomes of allocation decisions.
Cappelen et al. (2013) comes perhaps closest to our study. They investigate the allocations
of both non-involved subjects and stakeholders in situations where inequalities in output are the
result of antecedent choices under risk. It appears that ex-post inequalities between risk takers
and non-risk takers are mostly viewed as fair, but that inequalities between lucky and unlucky
risk takers are eliminated. Although these authors allow for uncertainty their study substantially
differs from ours. Whereas Cappelen et al. (2013) look for allocation decisions after uncertainty
is resolved and, hence, the consequences of any redistribution decision are known with certainty,
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we study just allocations before uncertainty is resolved. Moreover, we study situations where
recipients are equally deserving whereas the cited study looks at issues of merit.
Two interesting recent studies that also allow for risk in allocation decisions are
Rohde and Rohde (2011) and Brock et al. (2013). In these papers the focus is on decisions
of involved subjects who may or may not exhibit other-regarding preferences. The first study
finds that even though people show concerns for inequality in a riskless setting they are little
affected by the risk exposure of other subjects. The latter study finds that in a risky environment
dictator giving is consistent with a mix of expected value comparisons and ex post considerations.
Neither of these studies explores questions related to justice views.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the studied allocation
problems and provide a theoretical framework for discussing justice under uncertainty. Section 3
describes the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 contains the results and Section 5
concludes. The instructions of the experiment are provided in the Appendix.
2 General Set-Up and Theoretical Framework
General set-up. In order to study views of justice in allocation problems with outcome uncer-
tainty we explore various such problems, denoted by m ∈ {1, ..M}. In each allocation problem,
an uninvolved third party has to divide between two recipients a monetary amount X jointly
produced by them. To isolate the effect of uncertainty the production task is calibrated such
that equal contributions to the production of X are (almost certainly) guaranteed. Moreover,
anonymity of the uninvolved person as well as both recipients is ensured. Hence, the third party
does not have any information about recipients’ characteristics that would allow to discriminate
between recipients, implying that they should be viewed as equally deserving.4
Recipients only differ in that one of them, for convenience called U , is exposed to uncertainty
whereas the other, for convenience called C, faces certainty. Importantly, whether a recipient is
exposed to uncertainty or not is beyond her influence. Specifically, in each allocation problem
m the uninvolved third party has to divide the amount X between recipients U and C, with
X = xU +xC . Recipient U ’s final outcome depends on which of two possible events realizes after
the allocation of xU . The ‘good’ event e realizes with probability p in which case the amount xU
allocated to U is multiplied by k > 1. With probability 1− p the ‘bad’ event e¯ realizes, with the
consequence that xU is multiplied by k¯ (1 > k ≥ 0).
4Under anonymity (symmetry) basically all theoretical rules of justice imply equality (see, e.g., Young 1995).
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Next to the effect of uncertainty per se we are also interested in how different degrees of
uncertainty affect just allocations. Therefore, the investigated allocation problems differ in the
likelihoods (p, 1 − p) of the good and bad events as well as in the consequences (k, k¯) coupled
with these events. In order to meaningfully compare allocations across different problems we
have to ensure that they are not confounded by other motives, like material efficiency concerns.
We achieve this by choosing k, k¯, and p such that in each allocation problem m it holds that
p xU k + (1− p) xU k = xU . (1)
Hence, in expectation U receives exactly what is allocated to her in each allocation problem. This
property ensures specifically that motivations related to risk exposure can not be confounded
with expected material efficiency concerns when analyzing allocations decisions.5
The allocation problems are chosen such that for every concave utility function for money the
expected utility of a given allocation xU to U in problem m is larger than the expected utility
in problem m + 1. Together with the fact that expected values stay constant (Equation (1))
this implies that the allocation problems can be ranked with respect to second-order stochastic
dominance (Mas-Colell et al. 1995, p. 197). Accordingly, we will call allocation problem m + 1
riskier than problem m.6 By varying the riskiness of U ’s final outcome in that way we can study
whether just allocations are influenced by the dispersion of final outcomes.7
Theoretical framework. Scholars of distributive justice research invoked uncertainty as a
means to discuss and rationalize justice principles (Rawls 1971, Konow 2003) and there is a long
theoretical tradition discussing normative questions of how to assess social situations involving
risk (see Section 1, Footnote 1 and the literature cited therein). The concepts proposed in this
literature can not be transferred one-to-one to our allocation problems but we will use them as
guidance in the theoretical ideas regarding just allocations under uncertainty, developed below.
5For the importance of material efficiency concerns in resource allocations, see Engelmann and Strobel (2004).
With our assumption, we do no want to imply that expected material efficiency may not be interesting when
investigating justice under uncertainty. quite to the contrary. However, as this is the first experimental study on
justice under uncertainty we decided to keep the set-up free from potential influences due to other motives as good
as possible.
6Details about parameter values chosen in the experiment are presented in Section 3. The theoretical results
derived below are independent of these specific parameter values.
7We also investigated two allocation problems characterized by ambiguity. For brevity we do not discuss them
in the main text but present their characteristics and the corresponding results in Appendix C.
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We first derive predictions based on three variations of the principle of ‘equal treatment of equals’
and then consider justice from a utilitarian perspective, which takes efficiency considerations into
account.
The principle of ‘equal treatment of equals’ is relevant for the problems we study for two
reasons. First, recipients can not be discriminated on the basis of any characteristic other than
their exposure to uncertainty. Second, as exposure to uncertainty is exogenous and randomly
assigned, recipients should not be held responsible for their position. However, equal treatment
of equals can not straightforwardly be implemented because the presence of uncertainty impedes
full equality in ex-post outcomes, that is in outcomes after uncertainty is resolved. Therefore, the
implementation of the principle of equality is open to different interpretations. We propose three
concepts that could be applied: equality in expected outcomes, equality in expected utilities,
and equality in realized outcomes.
First, equality in expected outcomes can be defended as a principle of justice under uncer-
tainty on the basis of equity considerations and the more recent idea of accountability (Konow
1996, 2003). Since in each allocation problem the expected value of an allocation is the allocation
itself (cf. Equation (1)) equality in expected outcomes implies splitting X equally between the
two recipients, in all allocation problems. That is,
xU = xC =
1
2
X. (2)
This approach guarantees that U and C enjoy the same outcome in expected value. Therefore,
we call it EV-equality.
Second, the justice idea of equality in expected utilities is related to Sen’s (1997) Weak
Equity Axiom which states that those in a disadvantaged position should be compensated (see
also Rawls 1971). As most individuals are risk averse (Dohmen et al. 2009), recipients exposed
to uncertainty can be considered to be disadvantaged and, hence, should be compensated by
allocating them ex-ante more resources than individuals facing certainty.
Formally, allocations xU and xC , satisfying equality of expected utilities W (x),
8 have to solve
E[W (xU )] = E[W (xC)] s.t. xU + xC = X.
In order to make quantitative predictions on allocations we assume that individuals can be
characterized by a utility function for money W (x) = xα that reflects their risk preferences
8Since from the viewpoint of the third party recipients do not differ in any aspects except for their exposure to
uncertainty it is natural to assume that they are characterized by the same utility function.
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(Wakker 2010). Together with the definition of our allocation problems the above condition can
be rewritten as
p (xU k)
α + (1− p) (xU k)
α = (xC)
α.
Solving this equation with respect to xU and xC gives the just allocations
xU =
1
exp(Zα−1) + 1
X, xC =
exp(Zα−1)
exp(Zα−1) + 1
X, (3)
where Z = ln[p(k)α + (1 − p)(k)α]. As this allocation of X guarantees that U and C enjoy the
same expected utility we call the corresponding justice idea EU-equality.9
From Equation (1) it follows that for all α ∈ ]0, 1[, Z < 0 and, hence, exp(Zα−1) < 1. Thus,
for risk-averse recipients, the allocations in (3) imply that in all allocation problems characterized
by uncertainty recipient U should be allocated more than recipient C. Further, the just allocation
to U increases with the riskiness of the allocation problem, which follows from the fact that Z is
decreasing in the problems’ riskiness.
The allocations in (3) are also just according to EU-equality when we assume that risk is
positively valued (i.e., α > 1). In that case, U should be allocated less than C and the allocation
to U decreases with the riskiness of the allocation problem.
Third, equality can also be sought ex-post, that is after uncertainty has been resolved. This
strictest form of outcome equality is related to the idea of egalitarianism (e.g., Deutsch 1985).
With uncertainty, however, perfect equality is impossible to achieve and treating U and C equally
ex post can be approximated by choosing allocations that minimize the expected difference
between U ’s and C’s final earnings. That is, allocations xU and xC have to satisfy
min
xU ,xC
p |kxU − xC |+ (1− p)
∣∣kxU − xC
∣∣ s.t. xU + xC = X.
The solution of the above minimization problem yields
xU =
1
k + 1
X, xC =
k
k + 1
X, (4)
which implies that the allocation to the recipient exposed to uncertainty is smaller than the
allocation to the recipient facing certainty (k > 1 in all allocation problems). We call this justice
idea ex-post equality.
Note that, ex-post equal allocations do not depend on risk attitudes because the justice idea
is applied after uncertainty is resolved. Therefore, the allocations in (4) are also just when the
aim is to minimize (expected) utility differences, instead of outcome differences.
9The proofs of these and the other formal results in the main text are presented in Appendix A.
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The three justice principles discussed so far ignore efficiency considerations. Utilitarianism
takes such considerations into account. It proposes to pursue the greatest aggregate level of
utility, which implies that more resources should be allocated to the person that derives the
greater utility from it. An important virtue of this criterion is that it selects an allocation on
the utility efficiency frontier.
When recipients are identical and risk neutral the utilitarian principle does not select a unique
allocation and any allocation of X would be considered as just. However, if recipients are risk
averse a given allocation yields less expected utility to U than to C and utilitarianism prescribes
to allocate a smaller amount to U than to C. Formally, the allocations xU and xC have to satisfy
max
xU ,xC
E[W (xU ) +W (xC)] s.t. xU + xC = X,
which, given our assumptions, is equivalent to
max
xU ,xC
p(xU k)
α + (1− p) (xU k)
α + (xC)
α s.t. xU + xC = X,
and gives the just allocations
xU =
1
exp(−Z (1− α)−1) + 1
X, xC =
exp(−Z (1− α)−1)
exp(−Z (1− α)−1) + 1
X, (5)
with Z = ln[p(k)α + (1− p)(k)α]. We call these just allocations utilitarian.
Note, that exp(−Z (1 − α)−1) > 1 for all α ∈ ]0, 1[ implies that in the just allocations given
by (5), U is allocated less than C. Further, it holds that the higher the riskiness of U ’s final
earnings the less U is allocated. If α > 1, that is when recipients are characterized by risk seeking
preferences, the maximization of total welfare implies that all X is allocated to U .
Table 1 summarizes the distributional implications of these four views of justice under un-
certainty. It also shows the relation of just allocations to U and C in dependence of whether risk
averse or risk seeking preferences are assumed.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
The experiment consists of three parts: (1) the production of the resource X by recipients C and
U , (2) the just allocation of X between by C and U by the uninvolved third-party (‘Benevolent
Dictator’) BD, and (3) the elicitation of risk preferences, beliefs about risk preferences and other
individual characteristics of all participants. In the following we describe the different parts in
more detail.
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Table 1: Just Allocations under Uncertainty
Relation between xU and xC
xU Risk Averse Risk Seeking
EV-equality 12X xU = xC xU = xC
EU-equality 1
exp(Zα−1)+1
X xU > xC xU < xC
Ex-Post Equality 1
k+1X xU < xC xU < xC
Utilitarian 1
exp(−Z(1−α)−1)+1
X xU < xC xU > xC
Part 1: production of resource X. Each participant is randomly assigned a seat in a vision
isolated cubicle equipped with a networked computer. After each participant has taken a seat,
instructions for the first and second part of the experiment are distributed and read aloud by
the experimenter. Participants are randomly matched into groups of three and assigned the
role of either recipient U , recipient C, or third party BD. These roles are fixed throughout the
experiment.10
In the first part of the experiment U and C work individually on a real effort task, while BD
is idle. The real effort task consists of the so-called ‘slider task’ introduced by Gill and Prowse
(2012). In our version 32 sliders on horizontal bars are displayed on the computer screen. Using
the mouse, each slider can be moved to any point of the bar and the actual position of a slider
is displayed as a number between 0 and 100 to the right of the bar. The task is to position as
many sliders as possible exactly in the middle of a bar. The slider is correctly positioned when
the number 50 pops is displayed next up the slider.11 A recipient’s score in the task, that is his
productivity, is equal to the number of sliders positioned at 50 in 6 minutes time. During the
task the achieved score and the remaining time are displayed at the top of the screen. We chose
the slider task because it is easy to explain and understand, is identical across repetitions, and
does not leave room for guessing.
The slider task is incentivized. For each correctly positioned slider AC 0.25 are credited,
implying that each recipient can get credited up to AC 8. After the time for the task has expired,
all three members of a group are informed about the productivity of U and C and, hence, the
total amount of money generated, which is deposited in a group account. In order to minimize
10In the experiment subjects are assigned the neutral labels A, B, and C.
11Figure E.1 in Appendix E shows examples of the slider task.
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the likelihood of productivity differences we have chosen the number of sliders and the available
time to complete the task such that maximum productivity can easily be achieved.
Part 2: just allocation of X. In this part of the experiment the BD has to allocate the
amount X in the group account between U and C, who are not active in this part. Since
recipients U and C exerted effort in the first part, and are thus not mere money recipients, the
BD should be motivated to make a just allocation decision (Konow 2000). Importantly, the
BD does not have any stakes in the group account as her payment for the allocation task is
independent of her decision and randomly determined at the end of the experiment. Specifically,
the BD can earn 4, 6, 10 or 12 Euro with equal chance. We have chosen this payment procedure
in order to maximize the likelihood that the third party’s only incentive is to implement her
normative just allocation. Further, we strove to minimize a potential experimenter demand
effect regarding the equal division, by not including 8 as a possible outcome.
The BD faces five allocation problems that satisfy the assumptions discussed above and are
summarized in Table 2. The allocation problem 1-Certainty serves as a benchmark where the
final earnings of both, U and C, are not uncertain and thus equal to the amounts xU and xC
allocated to them. In the other four allocation problems recipient U is exposed to uncertainty
while C faces certainty. In 2-Risk recipient U earns k = 1.5 times what is allocated to her with
probability p = 0.5 and with probability 1− p = 0.5 she earns only half her allocation (k¯ = 0.5).
The remaining allocation problems are constructed similarly. For instance, in 4-Risk p = 0.5,
k = 2, and k¯ = 0, implying that U earns either twice what is allocated to her or nothing, both
events having a chance of 50 percent. It is easy to see that expected earnings of U are exactly
xU in all allocation problems and that the spread of earnings, and hence riskiness, monotonically
increases from allocation problem 1-Certainty to 5-Risk.
Table 2: Allocation problems.
allocation problem final earnings of R final earnings of C
1-Certainty xU xC
2-Risk (0.5 : xU · 1.5, xU · 0.5) xC
3-Risk (0.8 : xU · 1.25, xU · 0) xC
4-Risk (0.5 : xU · 2, xU · 0) xC
5-Risk (0.2 : xU · 5, xU · 0) xC
Note: (p : xU ·k, xU ·k¯) denotes the uncertain outcome U is facing; xU + xR = X.
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In the experiment, these allocation problems appear on the screen one by one and the order
of appearance is randomized at the group level. Each BD has to make an allocation decision
in each problem. At the end of the experiment one problem is randomly selected to be relevant
for payment of U and C and uncertainty is resolved by using a stack of cards numbered from
1 to 100. For instance, for an allocation problem where U faces a 50 percent chance that her
allocation is doubled this indeed happens if a card with a number smaller than 51 is drawn. The
determination of earnings took place publicly at the end of the experiment so that subjects could
witness how uncertainty was resolved. Subjects were informed about this procedure before they
made any decisions.
Part 3: elicitation of individual characteristics. In the last part of the experiment we
gather data on risk preferences, beliefs about risk preferences and other individual characteristics
that could be related to allocations decisions of the BD. In order to measure risk preferences
we elicit the certainty equivalents of six two outcomes lotteries (cf. Fehr-Duda et al. 2006). For
each lottery subjects are asked to choose between the lottery and a number of sure payments.12
The parameters of the lotteries are chosen such that they allow to measure risk preferences for
the same outcome ranges as used in the allocation problems. At the end of the experiment one
decision is randomly selected to be relevant for payment and earnings are added to those of the
first part.
We also elicit subjects’ beliefs about others’ risk preferences. For that purpose subjects have
to estimate the choices of a randomly matched group member in four lotteries. This belief
elicitation is incentivized with the interval scoring rule (Schlag and van der Weele 2009). Each
participant is asked to indicate what s/he believes is the minimum and the maximum certainty
equivalent of the matched participant for each lottery.13
At the end of third part of the experiment subjects are asked some socioeconomic questions
and BD’s are asked some questions regarding their decisions in the first part of the experiment.
Thereafter subjects are privately payed out in cash and dismissed.
12The details of the used lotteries can be found in Table D.1 of Appendix D. Certainty equivalents are calculated
as the arithmetic mean of the smallest sure amount preferred to the lottery and the consecutive sure amount on
the list. Subjects are forced to switch from the sure payment to the lottery only once, as consistency is crucial for
the successive elicitation of beliefs about others’ preferences.
13The interval scoring rule has two advantages compared to other belief elicitation procedures. First, it is less
time consuming and less cognitively demanding then eliciting the probabilities over all possible events. Second,
the interval scoring rule allows inferences that are valid under any degree of subjects’ risk aversion and not only
when subjects are risk neutral (Schlag and van der Weele 2009).
12
The computerized experiment was conducted in the Behavioral and Experimental Economics
lab (BEElab) at Maastricht University School of Business and Economics, using the z-tree soft-
ware (Fischbacher 2007). In total 90 students from Maastricht University participated in the
experiment. Most of them (82 percent) were enrolled in the School of Business and Economics
and the rest came from a variety of studies, such as law, medicine and arts. 47 percent of
the subjects were male and the average age was 23.5 years. An experimental session lasted
approximately 80 minutes and the average earnings per subject were AC 17.
4 Results
In this section we first present descriptive statistics and statistical tests on BDs allocation be-
havior. We then proceed by analyzing the relationship between individuals’ characteristics and
allocations. Lastly, we estimate the distribution of theoretical justice ideas in our sample.
4.1 Just Allocations under Uncertainty
Our design of the production phase successfully induced maximum performance of both U and
C in almost all of the 30 groups. Only in two groups maximum performance was not achieved.
In the following analysis we exclude these two groups in order to rule out confounding effects on
the allocation decisions of the BD due to recipients’ productivity differences. Consequently, for
all analyzed groups the group account X that has to be allocated equals AC 16.
To set the stage we consider first allocation problem 1-Certainty in which there is no uncer-
tainty about final earnings. In this problem treating U and C equally unambiguously implies
to split the group account in two equal shares, which is also efficient. Alternatively, as BDs do
not have stakes in the allocation, they may choose randomly in which case we should see widely
dispersed allocation decisions. Therefore, the allocations observed in this problem also provide
a test of whether our approach is successfully eliciting just allocations.
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of allocations to U (that is, xU ). Except for two outliers,
BDs split the amount in the group account indeed equally between U and C. This clearly
demonstrates that (almost all of) our BDs care about treating equally deserving individuals
equally.
Result 1. When there is no uncertainty, just allocations amount to splitting the monetary output
equally between recipients.
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Figure 1: Allocations to recipient U in 1-Certainty
Allocation behavior changes drastically in allocation problems with uncertainty. Figure 2
shows the distributions of allocations to recipient U in allocation problems 2-Risk to 5-Risk.
The distributions clearly indicate that just allocations differ across BDs within each allocation
problem as well as across allocation problems.
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Figure 2: Allocations to recipient U in allocations problems with uncertainty
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In the following we first test if for a given allocation problem the distribution of just allocations
differs from the distribution where X would be allocated equally between recipients, that is
xU = xC = 8. Thereafter, we test if distributions of just allocations differ across allocation
problems.
Table 3: Allocations to recipient U
allocation to U
allocation problem mean st.dev. WSR test K-S test
1-Certainty 8.39 1.59 p=0.16 p=1.00
2-Risk 8.50 1.43 p=0.16 p=0.07
3-Risk 8.13 1.69 p=0.90 p=0.01
4-Risk 7.33 2.10 p=0.12 p=0.02
5-Risk 5.10 2.84 p=0.00 p=0.00
Note: WSR ... Wilcoxon signed-rank, K-S ... Kolmogorov-Smirnov; the
nul hypothesis for both tests is that the true distribution is that all BDs
allocate 8 to recipient U .
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics and statistical tests regarding allocations to recipi-
ents U .14 Wilcoxon signed rank (WSR) tests reject the null hypothesis that the median allocation
to U is significantly different from 8 only in allocation problem 5-Risk, where less is allocated to
U (Table 3 column 4). However, WSR tests pick up information only about differences in first
moments and do not capture the large variety of allocations clearly visible in Figure 2. Therefore,
for each allocation problem, we also employ Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests to compare actual
distributions to the hypothetical distribution where an equal split is uniformly chosen. We find
that in all allocation problems with uncertainty the distribution of allocations is significantly
different from uniformly choosing 8. This holds at the 5 percent significance level, except for
2-Risk where p = 0.07 (Table 3 column 5).
Result 2. In all allocation problems with uncertainty, allocations are widely dispersed and sig-
nificantly different from the equal split.
The distributions depicted in Figure 2 also suggest that BDs allocation decisions are related
to the problems’ riskiness, which increases from 2-Risk to 5-Risk. It is most pronounced for
allocation problem 5-Risk which exhibits allocations that are clearly skewed toward giving less
14If not indicated otherwise all reported statistical tests are two-sided
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to the recipient facing uncertainty. To test this we compare all allocation problems pair-wise.
Table 4 summarizes the results of these comparisons, where we correct for multiple testing using
the ‘false discovery rate’ method (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995). The results show that, ex-
cept for 2-Risk, distributions in all allocation problems with uncertainty differ significantly from
1-Certainty (Table 4, row 1-Certainty). Moreover, we observe significant differences between
allocation problems characterized by uncertainty. Specifically, allocations in 5-Risk are signifi-
cantly different from allocations in all other problems (Table 4, column 5-Risk). Together with
the information on mean allocations (Table 3) we can conclude that allocations to recipient U
indeed are lower the higher the riskiness of the allocation problem.
Table 4: Pair-wise comparisons of allocation problems
2-Risk 3-Risk 4-Risk 5-Risk
1-Certainty x[x] x[***] *[**] ***[***]
2-Risk x[x] **[x] ***[***]
3-Risk x[x] ***[***]
4-Risk ***[***]
Note: WSR [K-S] tests; an x indicates that there is no statis-
tically significant differences. ***, **, * indicates significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Result 3. Just allocations to recipients exposed to uncertainty are lower the higher the riskiness
of the allocation problem. Specifically, when these recipients’ exposure to uncertainty is highest
the amount allocated is significantly less than in all other allocation problems.
In the following we zoom in to the individual data and explore whether the variation in
just allocations is related to variations in BDs’ risk preferences, their beliefs about others’ risk
preferences, and other characteristics we have elicited in Part 3 of the experiment. In order
to estimate a subject’s risk preference we use the certainty equivalents elicited in the lottery
tasks and assume that subjects’ preferences can be represented by a utility function for money
W (x) = xα. We then estimate the value of α for each subject by minimizing the sum of squared
distances between predicted and observed certainty equivalents (Wakker 2008, 2010).15 The
15Formally, α is chosen such that
min
α
6∑
i=1
[(piy
α
i + (1− pi)z
α
i )
1
α − cei]
2
,
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average estimated level of risk aversion of BDs is moderate (mean α = 0.77, st.dev = 0.24,
median α = 0.79) and in keeping with the literature (Holt and Laury 2002).16
In order to estimate subjects’ beliefs about others’ risk preferences we take the midpoints of
the elicited intervals regarding others’ certainty equivalents in the lottery tasks and employ the
same method used for the estimation of risk preferences. We find that BDs’ beliefs about U ’s and
C’s risk preferences are on average close to their own risk preferences and imperfectly correlated
with them (mean believed α = 0.72; Spearman’s ρ = 0.61, p < 0.001; Pearson correlation
coefficient = 0.48, p = 0.01).
To understand whether BDs’ allocations are related to elicited individual characteristics we
run an OLS regression with xU as dependent variable. As reported above, BDs’ own risk pref-
erences and beliefs about recipients’ risk preferences are correlated. Hence, we run a regression
where we only included the BDs ‘believed α’ and another where we instead included the BDs
own α. In the latter case the coefficient estimate of α is significant and in the former case the
coefficient estimate of ‘believed α’ is insignificant. Hence, we only report results where α, but
not the beliefs measure, is included in the regression. We also introduced a trend variable (‘risk-
iness’) that orders the allocation problems according to their riskiness and a dummy variable
for gender (‘female’), that takes value 1 for female and 0 for male BDs. Table 5 reports the
regression results. The significantly negative coefficient of ‘riskiness’ corroborates the finding
reported above using non-parametric tests that BDs allocation to U decreases with the riskiness
of the allocation problem. Further, allocations to U are also negatively and significantly related
to BD’s own risk aversion.17 Hence, on average, the more risk averse a BD is the more she
allocates to recipient U . It appears that gender is not significantly related to BDs allocations.
Result 4. Just allocations to recipients exposed to uncertainty significantly decrease with higher
riskiness of the allocation problem. Moreover, just allocations are significantly positively related to
BDs’ own aversion to risk. BDs gender and beliefs about recipients’ risk attitudes are unrelated
with their allocation decision.
where the first term in brackets indicates the theoretically predicted certainty equivalent for lottery i and cei is
the elicited certainty equivalent of lottery i. To correct for heteroscedasticity lotteries are normalized to uniform
length.
16Pair-wise comparisons of BDs’, Us’, and Cs’ risk attitudes do not detect any statistically significant differences
(Mann-Whitney tests, p ≥ 0.14).
17In the regression two outlier allocations equal to 0 made by an extremely risk averse BD are excluded. When
included, the coefficient of riskiness remains significant but alpha becomes insignificant.
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Table 5: Determinants of allocations to U
dep. var.: allocation to U
Coefficient (Std. Err.)
riskiness -0.998∗∗∗ (0.209)
alpha -1.877∗∗ (0.921)
gender 0.191 (0.393)
intercept 12.243∗∗∗ (1.020)
N 110
R2 0.292
F (3,27) 9.74
Note: ∗∗∗(∗∗) indicates significance at the 1 (5)
percent level; OLS regression; standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clus-
tered on the 28 subjects.
4.2 Views of Justice under Uncertainty
In relation to the theoretical framework laid out in Section 2 the above results indicate that, on
average, BDs employ a utilitarian justice idea. Utilitarian allocations for risk averse recipients
prescribe to allocate less to recipient U than to recipient C and also that allocations to U
decrease with higher riskiness of the allocation problem (see Table 1 and Equation (5)). However,
an important aspect of our data is the large variety in just allocations within each allocation
problem. As this can only partly be explained by variations in risk aversion, it suggests that
different BDs have different ideas of just allocations as soon as uncertainty comes into play. In
the following we use the theoretical just allocations derived in Section 2 and classify BDs into
corresponding justice types.
Just allocations based on EU-equality or utilitarianism depend on the risk preferences of
recipient U (see Table 1). Therefore, in order to calculate allocations for each justice view on an
individual basis, we need to make assumptions on how risk preferences enter each BDs allocation
decisions. In the experiment BDs do not know recipients’ risk preferences, implying that they
have to apply either their own risk attitudes or their beliefs about recipients’ risk attitudes.
In order to calculate predicted allocations for EU-equality and utilitarianism we assume that
BDs evaluate recipient U ’s position from their own viewpoint. That is, for each BD we apply
his/her estimated risk preference parameter α. This seems reasonable given that BDs’ own
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risk preferences are related to their allocation decisions whereas their beliefs about recipients’
risk preferences are not. Just allocations according to EV-equality and ex-post equality do only
invoke material outcomes and are, thus, independent of risk attitudes (see Table 1).
After computing allocations according to each justice view at the individual level, we estimate
which view best represents an individual’s allocation decisions across all allocation problems. To
this end, we calculate the squared distance between each allocation decision under uncertainty
and the four theoretical just allocations. The justice view that minimizes the sum of squared
residuals over all risky allocation problems is then considered to represent an individual’s justice
type. Formally, we estimate for each individual BDi
min
j
5∑
m=2
(ymi − x
j,m
i )
2, (6)
where ymi is the actual amount allocated by BDi to recipient U in allocation problem m and
x
j,m
i is the amount recipient U should receive in allocation problem m according to justice view
j = {EV-equality,EU-equality, ex-post equality,utilitarian} of BDi.
Result 5. Of the BDs, 39 percent are best represented by EV-equality, 29 percent by utilitari-
anism, 18 percent by ex-post equality, and 14 percent by EU-equality.18
Hence, although on average utilitarianism best represents just allocations under uncertainty,
this result shows that most BDs are best represented by EV-equality that equalizes expected
earnings of both recipients. Moreover, a non-negligible minority of 18 percent neglects ex-ante
justice considerations and adopts an ex-post equality view. The smallest group is the one rep-
resented by EU-equality, which are basically those BDs who give more to recipient U than to
recipient C in all allocation problems. Next to providing a clear classification according to justice
ideas under uncertainty this result also corroborates that – under uncertainty – ideas about how
to justly treat recipients widely differ.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our study provides first empirical evidence on justice views when recipients of resources are
exposed to different levels of uncertainty. A main insight from our experiment is that equally
deserving recipients are treated very differently when one of them is exposed to uncertainty.
18It is worth noting that as the mean squared error equals 3.08 and the median is only 1.36 the fit of our
classification can be considered as rather good.
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Moreover, perhaps even more importantly, just allocations under uncertainty exhibit remarkable
heterogeneity. This holds even though under certainty our uninvolved decision makers implicitly
agree on the same just allocation, the equal split of resources. We also find that just allocations
respond to the degree of uncertainty, as the higher uncertainty the less is allocated to the recipient
exposed to it. Finally, social decision makers in our experiment are taking into account their
own risk preferences but seem to ignore (their beliefs about) the risk preferences of recipients.
Although one has to be careful in drawing general conclusions from an experiment, our
results suggest that heterogeneity in justice views may be part of an explanation for the regular
occurrence of controversies surrounding allocation problems with uncertain outcomes. In health
care, the public debate in Italy regarding the issue of whether or not taking into account health
risks in the allocation of health resources is an example at hand (Simoes et al. 2012). Also
public discussions as well as debates among medical ethics concerning just organ allocation
policy could be related to different views of justice when uncertain outcomes prevail (Childress
2001, Persad et al. 2009). Other domains where our results could be informative about the public
support of particular policies are the allocation of resources to curb poverty and fighting crime,
and policy programs to reduce unemployment.
What our results also highlight is that, with uncertainty, even in the absence of self-interest or
political ideology, there is not necessarily a consensus about the right policy to tackle societal or
economical problems. Hence, in order to successfully implement even a benevolent policy it will
be necessary to coordinate peoples views on the ‘fairness’ of the policy. Our study indicates that
this may not always be easy to achieve as people with very similar socio-economic backgrounds
already adhere to different justice views, ranging from utilitarianism to ex ante and ex post
versions of egalitarianism.
We consider our study as a first step toward a better understanding of peoples view of just
allocations and justice in general, when there is uncertainty about final outcomes. Naturally,
many questions remain open that may provide interesting avenues for future research. In order
to achieve clean comparisons, we have implemented a mean preserving spread when varying
the degree of uncertainty. It would be interesting to explore whether our results generalize to
other forms of uncertainty. Moreover, in order to avoid confounds, a special feature of our
design is that recipients are equally deserving. In future research it would be interesting to
investigate just allocation decisions under uncertainty when people are unequal at the outset.
Our results could serve as a basis for predictions in these circumstances. Such research could
explore the consequences of the combined pluralism of justice views under uncertainty we find
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with the pluralism of fairness ideals found by Cappelen et al. (2007), when there is certainty
but different degrees of deservingness. In our study uncertainty is exogenous and it may be
interesting to investigate how justice views change when combined with endogenously chosen
risks (cf. Cappelen et al. 2013, Cettolin and Tausch 2013).
In our study we focused on justice views and, thus, on allocation decisions of uninvolved
decision makers. It has been shown that when people have stakes in a distribution problem they
tend to interpret fairness in a way that is beneficial for themselves (see, e.g. Babcock et al. 1995,
Babcock and Loewenstein 1997, Ga¨chter and Riedl 2005, Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido
2012). Further, such self-serving biases seem to emerge especially when information on the
relation between actions and outcomes can be selectively chosen or interpreted (Dana et al.
2006, 2007). Thus, an interesting extension of our study could be to investigate behavior of
stakeholders who are exposed to risk (similar to, e.g., in Brock et al. 2013) and relate it to
possibly self-serving interpretations of justice views. Our results on the prevalence and pluralism
of views of justice under uncertainty provide a necessary first step for such investigations.
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Appendix
A Just Allocations under Uncertainty: Analytical Derivations
Here we formally derive the just allocations according to the fairness views EU-equality, ex-post
equality, and utilitarianism, respectively, discussed in Section 2 of the main text.
A.1 EU-equality
EU-equality requires equalization of expected utilities, that is
E[W (xU )] = E[W (xC)] s.t. xU + xC = X.
Assuming W (x) = xα, using the definition of our allocation problems (see equation (1) in the
main text) and substituting the constraint we can rewrite the previous equations as
p (xU k)
α + (1− p) (xU k)
α = (X − xU)
α
⇔
lnxαU + ln(pk
α + (1− p)k
α
) = ln(X − xU )
α.
Define Z := ln[pkα + (1− p)k
α
] and rewrite the previous equation to
α lnxU + Z = α ln(X − xU )
⇔
X
xU
− 1 = exp(Zα−1),
which after some more rearrangements gives the just allocations to U and C as
x
EU−eq
U =
1
exp(Zα−1) + 1
X, x
EU−eq
C =
exp(Zα−1)
exp(Zα−1) + 1
X.

A.2 Ex-post equality
Ex-post equality requires the minimization of inequality after uncertainty has been resolved, that
is, using the definition of our allocation problems (see equation (1) in the main text),
min
xU ,xC
p |kxU − xC |+ (1− p)
∣∣kxU − xC
∣∣ s.t. xU + xC = X.
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Substituting the constraint, the minimization problem becomes
min
xU
p |xU (k + 1)−X)|+ (1− p)
∣∣xU (k + 1)−X
∣∣ .
In order to find the minimizing xU we have to distinguish three cases.
case 1 xU ≥
X
k+1
(⇒ xU ≥
X
k+1):
That is, min
xU
p[xU (k + 1)−X)] + (1− p)[xU (k + 1)−X] :
∂
∂xU
= p(k + 1) + (1− p)(k + 1) > 0⇒
xU =
X
k + 1
minimizes the function.
case 2 xU ≤
X
k+1 (⇒ xU ≤
X
k+1
):
That is, min
xU
p[X − xU (k + 1))] + (1− p)[X − xU (k + 1)] :
∂
∂xU
= −p(k + 1)− (1− p)(k + 1) < 0⇒
xU =
X
k + 1
minimizes the function.
case 3 X
k+1 ≤ xU ≤
X
k+1
:
That is, min
xU
p[xU(k + 1)−X] + (1− p)[X − xU (k + 1)] :
∂
∂xU
= p(k + 1)− (1− p)(k + 1),
∂
∂xU
> 0 because
p
1− p
>
k + 1
k + 1
∀p, k, k
and xU =
X
k + 1
minimizes the function.
Since the function to minimize is continuous in xU , increasing for xU ≥
X
k+1 and decreasing for
xU ≤
X
k+1 , it follows that the global minimum is obtained at
X
k+1 . Therefore, the just allocations
under ex-post equality are given by
x
ex−posteq
U =
1
k + 1
X, x
ex−posteq
C =
k
k + 1
X.

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A.3 Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism requires the maximization of the expected sum of utilities, that is
max
xU ,xC
E[W (xU ) +W (xC)] s.t. xU + xC = X
Again, assuming W (x) = xα, using the definition of our allocation problems (see equation (1) in
the main text) and substituting the constraint we can rewrite the maximization problem as
max
xU
p(xUk)
α + (1− p)(xUk)
α + (X − xU )
α.
For 0 < α < 1 the function is concave and the first order condition is given by
∂
∂xU
= αpk(xUk)
α−1 + (1− p)αk(xUk)
α−1 − α(X − xU )
α−1 = 0
⇔ lnxα−1U + ln(pk
α + (1− p)k
α
) = ln(X − xU )
α−1
Define Z := ln[pkα + (1− p)k
α
] and rewrite the previous equation to
lnxα−1U + Z = ln(X − xU )
α−1 ⇔
X
xU
− 1 = exp(−Z(1− α)−1),
which after some more rearrangements gives the just allocations for risk averse recipients as
xutilU =
1
exp(−Z(1− α)−1) + 1
X, xutilC =
exp(−Z(1− α)−1)
exp(−Z(1− α)−1) + 1
X.
When considering risk seeking recipients (α > 1) the function to maximize is convex and, thus,
the solution to the maximization problem is
xutilU = X, x
util
C = 0.

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B Answers to Debriefing Questionnaire
In the following we provide some examples of answers provided by Benevolent Dictators in the
debriefing questionnaire, where they were asked to shortly explain their allocation decisions.
Answers are grouped into categories that correspond to the theoretically identified justice views.
Examples of answers related to EV-equality:
“I wanted to give B and C what they earned in their assignment, so 8 per person.
50% chance of 16 Euro and 50% chance of 0 Euro will also lead to a average earning
of 8 (when repeating it very often)”
“Both scored the same amount of money. I did not want to punish C for being
selected as C”
“I always allocated 8 because I thought this was most fair for C who always got the
amount allocated. C earned 8 so I thought it was good to always grant him that
amount. B had some random events that also influenced his earnings but since I
could not influence those, I didn’t take it into account”
Examples of answers related to EU-equality:
“tried to give B a bit more as he has the risk.”
“compensate B with a higher amount to compensate the risk of him getting 0”
“Since B takes a higher risk, he/she deserves a higher payout to remedy the risk
he/she takes”
Examples of answers related to ex-post equality:
“Since it would be either 5 times the amount or nothing I wanted to let the amount
that B could earn be equal that of C. So I gave 3 points to B (so that this person
could earn 15 Euro) and the remaining 13 to C. This way the least amount of points
was ‘wasted’ and could lead to an equal distribution.”
“in case B is rewarded with money, the amount will be multiplied by 5. I chose this
distribution in order for everyone to have almost the same outcome”
“My aim was that if B wins, B won’t earn much more than C.”
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Examples of answers related to utilitarianism:
“Since B has greater possibilities to get 0. I allocate more to C.”
“The chance was low for B to win, therefore more money to C.”
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C Allocation Problems Characterized by Ambiguity
The experiment also included two allocation problems characterized by ambiguity, shown in
Table C.1, where the unknown probability is indicated by p.
Table C.1: Allocation problems under Ambiguity
allocation problem final earnings of U final earnings of C
6-Ambiguity (p : xU × 1.5, xU × 0.5) xC
7-Ambiguity (p : xU × 2, xU × 0) xC
In order to operationalize ambiguity in the laboratory a stack of 100 cards colored black and
red is used. Neither the participants nor the experimenter know the exact color composition of
the stack, and each participant is free to choose his/her winning color at the beginning of the
experiment.
Table C.2 shows descriptive statistics and statistical test on BDs’ allocations in the presence
of ambiguity. An interesting aspect of the allocations in 6-Ambiguity and 7-Ambiguity is that
Table C.2: Allocations in ambiguous allocation problems
allocation to U
allocation problem mean median st. dev. WSR test K-S test
6-Ambiguity 8.36 8 1.75 z=0.99 p=0.03
(p=0.32)
7-Ambiguity 7.73 8 2.39 z=-1.24 p=0.03
(p=0.21)
Note: WSR ... Wilcoxon signed-rank, K-S ... Kolmogorov-Smirnov; the
nul hypothesis for both tests is that the true distribution is that all BDs
allocate 8 to recipient U .
they do not differ from allocations in 2-Risk and 4-Risk, respectively (WSR tests). Given that
these pairs of prospects are characterized by the same potential outcomes, this result suggests
that Benevolent Dictators treat ambiguity no differently than a 50-50 prospect.
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D Risk Preference and Ambiguity Attitudes Elicitation Tasks
Table D.1 shows the lotteries used in the risk preferences elicitation task described in Section 3
(Part 3) of the main text.
In addition to risk preferences we also elicited subjects’ ambiguity attitudes. To this end,
subjects faced six decision screens where they made choices between an ambiguous lottery and
several risky ones. Both the ambiguous and the risky lotteries in a given decision screen were
characterized by the same outcome pair, which are those in Table D.1.
Table D.1: Lotteries
Lottery p1 x1 x2
1 0.20 40 0
2 0.50 16 0
3 0.80 10 0
4 0.50 12 4
5 0.25 16 4
6 0.33 12 0
Note: lotteries used in risk
preferences and ambiguity
attitudes elicitation tasks; p1
denotes the probability of
winning ACx1.
As in the first part of the experiment, ambiguity was generated with a deck of red and black
cards in unknown color composition. On each screen subjects saw a description of the ambiguous
lottery and a list of 20 risky lotteries. The first and the last risky lottery on the list were both
degenerate and guarantee, respectively, the high and the low outcome of the lottery. From row
to row in the list the likelihood of the high outcome decreased by 5%, while the likelihood of the
low outcome increased by 5%. In each decision screen, subjects could switch only once from the
risky to the ambiguous lottery.
Assuming subjective expected utility theory (Savage 1954), a subject’s switching point reveals
the bounds of the probability interval containing her prior belief on the ambiguous event. We take
the midpoint of the interval to be the prior belief. (As the length of the interval is always equal to
0.05 taking the midpoint cannot result in a large bias.) Since the ambiguous event is the same on
all decision screens, subjects should consistently reveal the same prior belief in all decisions. Pair-
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wise comparisons of elicited prior beliefs show that subjects indeed hold largely consistent beliefs
(p ≥ 0.22 Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Thus, for each subject we can construct a variable called
“prior-belief” defined as the average of the prior beliefs elicited from the six decision screens. The
mean prior-belief of Benevolent Dictators is equal to 0.46 (st.dev. = 0.08, median prior belief =
0.48), which indicates only a slight aversion to ambiguity. Notably the standard deviation of
prior-belief is very small, indicating very similar prior beliefs among Benevolent Dictators. Pair-
wise comparisons of BD’s, R’s and C’s prior beliefs reveal no statistically significant difference
between them (p ≥ 0.69, Mann-Whitney tests).
We also investigate subjects’ beliefs about others’ ambiguity preferences by asking sub-
jects to estimate the choices made by a randomly matched group member for two ambigu-
ous decision screens. The belief elicitation is incentivized with the interval scoring rule
(Schlag and van der Weele 2009). We use the average of the two elicited believed prior be-
liefs to get a measure of Benevolent Dictators’ belief about others’ ambiguity attitudes, where
ambiguity is disliked more the smaller the prior belief on the ambiguous event. We find that
Benevolent Dictators’ beliefs about others’ ambiguity attitudes are highly, though imperfectly,
correlated with their own attitudes toward ambiguity (Spearman’s ρ = 0.50, p = 0.009, Pearson
correlation coefficient = 0.61). Two outliers believing that others’ priors on the ambiguous event
were below 0.12, and thus unreasonably extreme, are excluded when conducting these tests.
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E Experimental Instructions
General
In this experiment you can earn money with the decisions you make. Your earnings may also
depend on chance events and the decisions of other participants. At the end of the experiment
you will be paid out in cash individually and confidentially. In order to ensure the highest level of
anonymity and confidentiality, the payment will be carried out by a person that is not involved in
this research project. The experimenters cannot link your earnings and decisions to your identity
in any way. During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate in any other way than
described in the instructions. If you have any questions please raise your hand. An experimenter
will then come to you and answer your questions in private. The experiment consists of three
parts. You will receive the instructions of a part only after the previous part has ended.
Part 1
In the first part of the experiment you will be randomly matched into groups of three participants,
which will be labeled with the letters A, B and C. In this part of the experiment the B and C
members of a group are asked to independently perform a task that involves correctly positioning
sliders on a bar. Below you can see the representation of a slider in the initial position a) and
in the correct position b), which is always in the middle of the bar. The slider is positioned
correctly if the number that shows up to the right of the slider equals 50.
(a) Initial slider position
(b) Correct slider position
Figure E.1: Examples of slider positions
For each correctly positioned slider 0.25 Euro are credited. There are a total of 32 sliders to
be positioned in 6 minutes time, so that B and C can be credited up to 8 Euro each. After the 6
minutes are over, the credit accumulated by B and C, who are in the same group, is deposited in
a joint group account. Each member of a group (A, B and C) is then informed about the total
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amount in the joint account of their group. A also receives information about how many sliders
were correctly positioned by B and C members in her or his group.
The task of A and earnings determination for A, B, and C: Person A earns money for
performing a task, which is described below. At the end of the experiment, the earnings of A
will be publicly and randomly determined by drawing a card from a stack of numbered cards.
The earnings of A can be 4.-, 6.-, 10.- or 12.- Euro and each of these earnings are equally likely.
Notice that the earnings of A only depend on chance. In particular, the earnings of A do in no
way depend on the decisions taken by A. Also notice that the earnings of A are not taken from
the joint account.
The task of A is to divide the amount of money in the joint account between B and C. A is asked
to make a division in 7 different decision situations. At the end of the experiment one out of the
7 decisions will be randomly selected to determine B and C earnings. Each decision situation is
independent and equally likely to be the one that determines the earnings of B and C. Therefore,
person A should carefully consider each decision and make each decision in isolation.
The 7 decision situations differ in the way the amount of money assigned to B and C translates
into earnings for B and C. The table below summarizes the 7 decision situations and shows
how the earnings of B and C are determined in each decision situation. Notice that during the
experiment the 7 decision situations will appear in random order. Please have a look at it.
Decision Earnings of B Earnings of C
1 allocation to B allocation to C
2 20% chance 5 times allocation to B, 80% times 0 allocation to C
3 50% chance 2 times allocation to B, 50% times 0 allocation to C
4 80% chance 1.25 times allocation to B, 20% times 0 allocation to C
5 50% chance 1.5 times allocation to B, 50% times 0.5 times allocation to B allocation to C
6 unknown chance 2 times allocation to B, unknown chance 0 allocation to C
7 unknown chance 1.5 times allocation to B, unknown chance 0.5 times allocation to B allocation to C
We will now explain each decision situation in detail.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 1 is selected to matter for payment then
the earnings of B are equal to the allocation to B and the earnings of C are equal to the allocation
to C.
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If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 2 is selected to matter for payment the
final earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance event. The
chance event will be the public drawing of a card from a stack of 100 cards numbered from 1 to
100. If a card with a number from 1 to 20 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 5 times
the money allocated to B (i.e., 500% of the allocation to B). If a number from 21 to 100 will be
drawn then the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. In other words, with 20% chance the earnings of B
will be 5 times the allocation to B and with 80% chance the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. The
earnings of C are equal to the allocation to C.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 3 is selected to matter for payment the
final earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance event. The
chance event will the public drawing of a card from a stack of 100 cards numbered from 1 to 100.
If a card with a number from 1 to 50 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 2 times the
allocation to B (i.e. 200% of the allocation to B). If a number from 51 to 100 will be drawn then
the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. In other words, with 50% chance the earnings of B will be 2
times the allocation to B and with 50% chance the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. The earnings
of C are equal to the allocation to C.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 4 is selected to matter for payment the
final earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance event. The
chance event will the public drawing of a card from a stack of 100 cards numbered from 1 to 100.
If a card with a number from 1 to 80 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 1.25 times the
allocation to B (i.e. 125% of the allocation to B). If a number from 81 to 100 will be drawn then
the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. In other words, with 80% chance the earnings of B will be 1.25
times the allocation to B and with 20% chance the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. The earnings
of C are equal to the allocation to C.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 5 is selected to matter for payment the
final earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance event. The
chance event will the public drawing of a card from a stack of 100 cards numbered from 1 to
100. If a card with a number from 1 to 50 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 1.5 times
the allocation to B (i.e. 150% of the allocation to B). If a number from 51 to 100 will be drawn
then the earnings of B will be 0.5 times the allocation to B (i.e. 50% of the allocation to B). In
other words, with 50% chance the earnings of B will be 1.5 times the allocation to B and with
50% chance the earnings of B will be 0.5 times the allocation to B. The earnings of C are equal
to the allocation to C.
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If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 6 is selected to matter for payment the
final earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance event. The
experimenters will first randomly select black or red to be the winning color. The chance event
will then be the public drawing of a card from a stack of 100 cards which are black or red.
The total number of red and black cards sums up to 100, but neither A nor B nor C nor the
experimenters know how many red cards and how many black cards are in the stack. If a card
with the winning color is drawn the earnings of B will be 2 times the allocation to B (i.e. 200%
of the allocation to B). If a card with the losing color is drawn then the earnings of B will be 0
Euro. In other words, with an unknown chance the earnings of B will be 2 times the allocation
to B and with an unknown chance the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. The earnings of C are equal
to the allocation to C.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 7 is selected to matter for payment the
final earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance event. The
experimenters will first randomly select black or red to be the winning color. The chance event
will then be the public drawing of a card from a stack of 100 cards which are black or red.
The total number of red and black cards sums up to 100, but neither A nor B nor C nor the
experimenters know how many red cards and how many black cards are in the stack. If a card
with the winning color is drawn the earnings of B will be 1.5 times the allocation to B (i.e. 150%
of the allocation to B). If a card with the losing color is drawn then the earnings of B will be
0.5 times the allocation to B (i.e. 50% of the allocation to B). In other words, with an unknown
chance the earnings of B will be 1.5 times the allocation to B and with an unknown chance the
earnings of B will be 0.5 times the allocation to B. The earnings of C are equal to the allocation
to C.
If you have any question please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to answer your
question in private. In the following you are asked a few questions that will help us assessing
your understanding of the decision situations described above. Please fill in the missing figures.
Note, that in these questions we are not interested in the actual numbers you fill in but only if
you fill them in correctly. During the experiment you will have the possibility to use a calculator
by clicking on the icon in the bottom right corner of the screen. When you are ready please raise
your hand and an experimenter will come to you to check your answers. Once you are ready
please wait quietly.
Consider decision situation 3 and assume that the total in the joint account is 16 Euro. If A
assigns . . . Euro to C and . . . Euro to B, then this means that with. . .% chance B earns . . . Euro
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and with . . . % chance . . . Euro. C earns . . . Euro.
Consider decision situation 5 and assume that the total in the joint account is 15 Euro. If A
assigns . . . Euro to C and . . . Euro to B, then this means that with . . .% chance B earns . . . Euro
and with . . . % chance . . . Euro. C earns . . . Euro.
Consider decision situation 7 and assume that the total in the joint account is 12 Euro. If A
assigns . . . Euro to C and . . . Euro to B, then this means that with . . .% chance B earns . . . Euro
and with . . . %chance . . . Euro. C earns . . . Euro.
Part 2
You are now going to make a series of decisions. These decisions will not influence your earnings
from the first part of the experiment, nor will the decisions you made in the first part of the
experiment influence the earnings from this part. Furthermore, the decisions you are going to
make will only influence your own earnings.
You will be confronted with 12 decision situations. All these decision situations are completely
independent of each other. A choice you made in one decision situation does not affect any of
the other following decision situations.
Each decision situation is displayed on a screen. The screen consists of 20 rows. You have to
decide for every row whether you prefer option A or option B. Option A is the same for every
row in a given decision situation, while option B takes 20 different values, one for each row.
Note that within a decision situation you can only switch once from option B to option A: if
you switch more than once a warning message will appear on the screen and you will be asked
to change your decisions. By clicking on NEXT you will see some examples screens of decision
situations.
This is a screen shot of a typical decision situation that you are going to face. You are not asked
to make choices now! Please have a careful look. Thereafter click on NEXT to proceed.
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This is another screen shot of a typical decision situation that you are going to face. If you want
to review the previous example click on BACK, otherwise click on NEXT to proceed.
Determination of earnings. At the end of the experiment one of the 12 decision situations
will be randomly selected with equal probability. Once the decision situation is selected, one
of the 20 rows in this decision situation will be randomly selected with equal probability. The
choice you have made in this specific row will determine your earnings.
Consider, for instance, the first screen shot that you have seen. Option A gives you a 25%
chance to earn 16.- Euro and a 75% chance to earn 4.- Euro. Option B is always a sure amount
that ranges from 16.- Euro in the first row, to 4.60 Euro in the 20th row. Suppose that the 12th
row is randomly selected. If you would have selected option B, you would receive 9.40 Euro. If,
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instead, you would have selected option A, the outcome of the lottery determines your earnings.
At the end of the experiment the lottery outcome will be publicly determined by randomly
drawing a card from a stack of numbered cards.
Consider now the second screen shot that you have seen. Option A gives you an unknown
chance to earn 12.- Euro and an unknown chance to earn 4.- Euro. Option B is always a lottery
that gives you different chances to earn 12.- Euro or 4.- Euro. Suppose that the 10th row is
randomly selected. If you would have selected option B, you would receive 12.- Euro with 55%
chance and 4.- Euro with 45% chance. If, instead, you would have selected option A, a stack of
red and black cards would be used at the end of the experiment to determine whether you earn
12.- Euro or 4.- Euro. This stack of cards will be the same that has been described in part 1:
recall that the exact number of black cards and the exact number of red cards in the stack are
unknown to you and to us as well. You would earn 12.- Euro if a card of the winning color is
drawn and 4.- Euro otherwise.
Please note that each decision situation has the same likelihood to be the one that is relevant
for your earnings. Therefore, you should view each decision independently and consider all your
choices carefully. If you like to, you can review the examples screens once more by clicking on
BACK. If you have any questions please raise your hand. When you are ready, please press the
BEGIN button below.
Part 3
In the following you are asked to estimate the choices made by one of your group members in 6
decision situations of the second part of the experiment. After having made these estimates you
will answer a questionnaire and then the experiment will be over.
You are going to be randomly matched to one of your group members. For a certain decision
situation you are asked to indicate which is the last row where you believe your matched group
member chooses option B before switching to option A. You earn 1 Euro if you correctly indicate
the switching point of your matched group member in a certain decision situation. Therefore,
you can earn up to 6 Euro in total. If the true switching point of your matched group member
is different from the point you indicated you earn nothing.
If you do not want to indicate a single switching point you can indicate a range of values where
you think the switching point of your matched group member lies. If the true switching point lies
in this range of values you will earn a positive amount smaller than 1 Euro. The exact amount
you earn is calculated according to a formula. The formula captures the idea that earnings
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are inversely related to the length of the interval you indicate. This means that the larger the
interval you indicate the smaller your potential earnings are. This formula also guarantees that
your earnings are maximized if you truthfully indicate your estimate. If the true switching point
of your counterpart lies outside the interval you indicate you earn nothing. Please click on NEXT
to view an example.
This is a screen shot of a typical screen that you are going to see.
Assume, for instance, that you believe that your matched group member chooses option B for
the last time when option B is equal to 6.- Euro. In such a case, you would type the number 6
in both boxes at the bottom of the screen.
Assume now that you believe that your matched group member may switch from option B to
option A when option B takes any value between 8.- Euro and 4.50 Euro. In such a case, you
would type the number 8 in the first box and the number 4.50 in the second box. Notice that
you earn nothing if you type in two values that cover all possible switching points, in this case
if you type in 10 and 0.50.
If you have any question please raise your hand. Otherwise click on NEXT to proceed.
This is another screen shot of a typical screen that you are going to face.
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Assume, for instance, that you believe that your matched group member chooses option B for
the last time when option B gives a chance of 40% to win 12.- Euro. In such a case, you would
type the number 40 in both boxes at the bottom of the screen.
Assume now that you believe that your matched group member switches from option B to option
A when the winning chance of option B is between 70% and 25%. In such a case, you would
type the number 70 in the first box and the number 25 in the second box. Notice that you earn
nothing if you type in two values that cover all possible switching points, that is if you type in
100 and 5.
If you have any question please raise your hand. If you want to review the previous examples
once more click on BACK. Otherwise, click on BEGIN to start the third part of the experiment.
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